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PRESUMPTIVE VALIDITY AND PROHIBITIVE
ZONING ORDINANCES
"It must always be borne in mind, however, that the
strong presumption in favor of the validity of a legislative act likewise applies to municipal and county
zoning ordinances and resolutions. No rule of zoning
law is better settled by the decisions of the courts."1
In Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bdc. 2 the new
seven judge Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania3 overruled the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County and
modified the well established rule that a zoning ordinance is
presumed constitutional and that the challenging party has
the burden of proof in establishing a lack of substantial relationship between the ordinance and public health, safety
and general welfare. The court held that a municipality enacting a zoning ordinance prohibiting a legitimate land use
within the entire municipal area must bear the burden of
showing a "more substantial" relationship to those interests
protected by its police power than is presumed to exist in the
more common, purely regulatory zoning ordinances.
The Borough of Osborn enacted a zoning ordinance which
created two residential districts and a small commercial district. The ordinance expressly prohibited gasoline service stations in the commercial district and by implication also prohibited them in the residential districts, thus banning their
use throughout the entire municipal area. The plaintiff corporation and the individual plaintiffs entered into a contract
for the sale of land located in the commercial district. The
contract was conditioned upon issuance of a service station
building permit by the borough council. When the permit
1 E. YOKELY, ZONING LAW AmD PRAcTicE § 2-23, at 104 (3d
ed. 1965).
2 1 Pa. Cmwlth. 458, 275 A.2d 702 (ComwlLh. Ct. 1971).
8 The Commonwealth Court Act, PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 211.2
(1970).
1
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was refused, appeal was taken to the Zoning Hearing Board
on the stipulated issue of the constitutionality of the zoning
ordinance. The board upheld the council's refusal by concluding that the prohibition in the ordinance was binding and the
plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County. After hearing oral arguments in which no evidence
de novo was presented, the court refused the appeal on the
traditional ground that the plaintiffs had not met the burden
of proof necessary to overcome the presumptive validity of the
ordinance. Thereafter, the appeal was taken to the Commonwealth Court where, with two dissenting opinions, the lower
court's decision was overturned.
There is a general presumption as to the constitutional
validity of legislation unless it is clearly within an express
constitutional prohibition.4 The presumption is said to be based
upon the separation of powers of the coordinate branches of
government.5 This presumption is normally classified as
strong, although rebuttable 6 and has been expressly extended
to municipal ordinances. 7 In cases where the general presum-.
tion of constitutionality is indulged, the burden of overcoming
or rebutting the presumption is on the challenging party."
The presumption of validity that attaches to the usual
zoning ordinance which merely proscribes certain land uses
in one or more areas of the municipality while permitting it
in another is said to be based, in addition to the separation of
4 Allen v. Burkhart, 377 P.2d 821 (Okla. 1962); Tate v. Logan,
362 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1961); Dobbs v. Board of Co. Comm'rs,
208 Okla. 514, 257 P.2d 802 (1953).
Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878); Allen v. Burkhart,
377 P.2d 821 (Okla. 1962); Tate v. Logan, 362 P.2d 670 (Okla.
1961).
6 Borden's Farm Prods. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934); United States v. Mullendore, 74 F.2d 286 (10th Cir. 1934).
7 Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141
A.2d 851 (1958).
8 White v. Coleman, 475 P.2d 404 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970);
Williamson v. State, 463 P.2d 1004 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
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powers doctrine, upon the fundamental reasonableness of such
land use regulation.9 Both Pennsylvania and Oklahoma indulge in this general presumption when challenges concerning the constitutionality of such ordinances arise. 10 However,
when an ordinance goes beyond restricting a use to a portion
of the municipality's area, so as to proscribe the use completely, it now appears that the Pennsylvania courts will not
presume constitutionality.
In Beaver the court reasoned that governmental proscription of a land use should be afforded the presumption of constitutionality only when there exists some fundamental and
reasonable purpose of control which has been consistently
demonstrated to bear a sufficient relationship to the interests
protected by the police power of the governmental unit involved." Discrimination between legitimate businesses by allowing some and completely proscribing others without clearly identifying the purpose of such prohibition was said to have
no basis in fundamental reasonableness. Using this reasoning
and the reasoning of an earlier Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision'12 the court held that in order to shift the burden of
9 Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 1 Pa. Cmwlth.
458, 460, 275 A.2d 702, 704 (Cmwlth. Ct. 1971); Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d
169, 174 (1967).
10 Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa.
43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967); Sand Springs v. Colliver, 434 P.2d
186 (Okla. 1967); National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
11 Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 1 Pa. Cmwlth.
458, 460, 275 A.2d 702, 704 (Cmwlth. Ct. 1971).
12 Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa.
43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967). In this decision the court held that
totally prohibitory zoning ordinances must bear a more
substantial relationship to the police power than those
which merely confine a business to certain areas of a municipality, and that the existence of that relationship is
suspect.
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proof to the municipality the challenging party need only
show that his proposed use is legitimate, that the prohibition
is total as to the municipality, and that his building plans
conform to all other requirements of the zoning and building
codes. 18 Once such a showing is made, the court held that the
validity of the ordinance depends upon the municipality proving the existence and propriety of its findings that the prohibited use would have detrimental effects upon the interests
protected by the police power, that the same undesirable effects are not caused by other permitted uses, and that those
effects are not capable of cure by regulation rather than prohibition."
The majority held that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to shift the burden to the municipality, that
the municipality had not met its burden and that, therefore,
insofar as all gasoline service stations were prohibited, the
ordinance was unconstitutional. 15
Two judges wrote concurring opinions. Judge Kramer
stated that the case should be remanded since the municipality
had not previously known of its burden of proof. 1 6 Judge
Manderino concurred in the result but disagreed that the burden of proof should be shifted to the municipality. To Judge
Manderino, the "burden of proving unconstitutionality" merely meant convincing the court that there was no relationship
between the prohibited conduct and the protection of society.
In those cases where general knowledge allows the court to
take judicial notice of the lack of the required nexus, the
municipality has the burden of going forward with evidence
sufficient to dispel the court's state of mind and the failure
18 Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 1 Pa. Cmwlth.

458, 461, 275 A.2d 702, 705 (Cmwlth. Ct. 1971).
Id. at 461-62, 275 A.2d at 705-06.
'r Id. at 462-63, 275 A-2d at 706-07.
16 Id. at 465, 275 A.2d at 710.
'4
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of a municipality to do so
should not be confused with who
17
has the burden of proof.
The first dissenting opinion expressed the belief that the
traditional presumption and burden placement was so well
settled as to warrant no shifting of the burden.18 The second
dissenting opinion stated that the constitutional validity of the
ordinance should be tested in the context of the facts peculiar
to the municipality. In view of the predominantly residential
character of the borough and the size and shape of the commercial district, the second dissenting judge was of the opinion
that the ordinance should be upheld. 19
While Oklahoma courts adhere to the general presumption
of the validity of ordinances and the traditional placement of
the burden of proof,20 no litigation involving the validity of a
zoning ordinance which completely prohibits a land use everywhere within a municipality has arisen in the state. However,
if confronted with such a prohibition and an attack on its
validity, the Oklahoma courts might be persuaded by the argument that such an ordinance does not rest upon any "fundamental and reasonable principle of governmental control which
has been consistently demonstrated to bear a sufficient relationship to the police power"21 and hold, as did the Pennsylvania majority, that the municipality rather than the challenging party must bear the burden of proof.
Charles L. Schwabe
Id. at 463-65, 275 A.2d at 707-09.
Id. at 467, 275 A.2d at 711.
J9 Id. at 469, 275 A.2d at 713-14.
20 See cases cited in notes 4 & 8 supra.
21 1 Pa. Cmwlth. at 460, 275 A.2d at 704.
17

18
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